

Specification, Proof and Correctness

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Proof, Formal and Otherwise

- ▶ Mathematical proof
- ▶ Formal proof
- ▶ Proof in Formal Methods
- ▶ Zero-Knowledge Proofs

Mathematical Proof

- ▶ **A convincing argument**
- ▶ Notion of “rigor” developed in the 1920s
- ▶ Hilbert’s program

Suppose $\sqrt{2}$ is rational.

That is, $\sqrt{2} = \frac{p}{q}$ for some $p \in \mathbb{Z}$ and $q \in \mathbb{N}$.

We can assume the fraction is in lowest terms.
That is, p and q share no common factors.

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Then } \sqrt{2}q &= p \\ 2q^2 &= p^2\end{aligned}$$

So p^2 is a multiple of 2,
therefore p must be a multiple of 2.

Write $p = 2m$.

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Then } 2q^2 &= (2m)^2 \\ 2q^2 &= 4m^2 \\ q^2 &= 2m^2.\end{aligned}$$

So q^2 is a multiple of 2,
therefore q is a multiple of 2.

Thus p and q share a common factor.

This is a contradiction!

Thus $\sqrt{2}$ is irrational.

Formal Proof

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \frac{}{\emptyset \vdash} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash A}{\Gamma, x:A \vdash} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash x:A \in \Gamma}{\Gamma \vdash x:A} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash t:A \quad \Gamma \vdash B \quad A \simeq_{\beta\eta} B}{\Gamma \vdash t:B} \\
 \\
 \frac{\Gamma \vdash A \quad \Gamma, x:A \vdash B}{\Gamma \vdash \Pi x:A. B} \quad \frac{\Gamma, x:A \vdash t:B}{\Gamma \vdash \lambda x:A. t : \Pi x:A. B} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash t : \Pi x:A. B \quad \Gamma \vdash u:A}{\Gamma \vdash t u : B\{x:=u\}} \\
 \\
 \frac{\Gamma \vdash A \quad \Gamma, x:A \vdash B}{\Gamma \vdash \Sigma x:A. B} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash t:A \quad \Gamma \vdash u:B\{x:=t\}}{\Gamma \vdash (t, u) : \Sigma x:A. B} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash t : \Sigma x:A. B}{\Gamma \vdash \pi_1(t) : A} \\
 \\
 \frac{\Gamma \vdash t : \Sigma x:A. B}{\Gamma \vdash \pi_2(t) : B\{x:=\pi_1(t)\}} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash}{\Gamma \vdash \mathbb{P}} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash A : \mathbb{P}}{\Gamma \vdash \underline{A}} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash}{\Gamma \vdash \mathcal{U}} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash A : \mathcal{U}}{\Gamma \vdash \underline{A}} \\
 \\
 \frac{\Gamma \vdash t:A \quad \Gamma \vdash u:A}{\Gamma \vdash t \equiv_A u : \mathbb{P}} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash t:A}{\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{refl} \equiv t : t \equiv_A t} \\
 \\
 \frac{\Gamma, x:A, p : t \equiv_A x \vdash P \quad \Gamma \vdash q : t \equiv_A t' \quad \Gamma \vdash u : P\{x:=t, p:=\mathbf{refl} \equiv t\}}{\Gamma \vdash J_{\equiv}(P, q, u) : P\{x:=t', p:=q\}} \\
 \\
 (\lambda x:A. t) u \simeq_{\beta\eta} t\{x:=u\} \quad \lambda x:A. t x \simeq_{\beta\eta} t \\
 \\
 \pi_1(t, t') \simeq_{\beta\eta} t \quad \pi_2(t, t') \simeq_{\beta\eta} t' \quad (\pi_1(t), \pi_2(t)) \simeq_{\beta\eta} t
 \end{array}$$

Formal Proof

$$\begin{aligned} & A[70 : \tau_0, 70 : \tau_1] \mid B[30 : \tau_0, 10 : \tau_1] \\ \xrightarrow{A:\text{dep}(70:\tau_0,70:\tau_1)} & A[70 : \{\tau_0, \tau_1\}] \mid B[30 : \tau_0, 10 : \tau_1] \mid \{70 : \tau_0, 70 : \tau_1\} \\ \xrightarrow{B:\text{swap}(30,\tau_0,\tau_1)} & A[70 : \{\tau_0, \tau_1\}] \mid B[0 : \tau_0, 31 : \tau_1] \mid \{100 : \tau_0, 49 : \tau_1\} \\ \xrightarrow{B:\text{swap}(21,\tau_1,\tau_0)} & A[70 : \{\tau_0, \tau_1\}] \mid B[30 : \tau_0, 10 : \tau_1] \mid \{70 : \tau_0, 70 : \tau_1\} \\ \xrightarrow{A:\text{rdm}(30:\{\tau_0,\tau_1\})} & A[30 : \tau_0, 30 : \tau_1, 40 : \{\tau_0, \tau_1\}] \mid B[30 : \tau_0, 10 : \tau_1] \mid \{40 : \tau_0, 40 : \tau_1\} \\ \xrightarrow{B:\text{swap}(30,\tau_0,\tau_1)} & A[30 : \tau_0, 30 : \tau_1, 40 : \{\tau_0, \tau_1\}] \mid B[0 : \tau_0, 27 : \tau_1] \mid \{70 : \tau_0, 23 : \tau_1\} \\ \xrightarrow{A:\text{rdm}(30:\{\tau_0,\tau_1\})} & A[82 : \tau_0, 47 : \tau_1, 10 : \{\tau_0, \tau_1\}] \mid B[0 : \tau_0, 27 : \tau_1] \mid \{18 : \tau_0, 6 : \tau_1\} \end{aligned}$$

Figure 1: Interactions between two users and an AMM.

Proof in Formal Verification

1. Interactive theorem provers (Isabelle/HOL, Coq, Lean *etc.*)
 - ▶ Mathematical proof and specification
 - ▶ Proofs (almost always) by induction, computational in nature
2. Model Checkers
 - ▶ Brute force proof over a discrete data type
 - ▶ Custom specification language

Proof in Formal Verification

```
1000 Proof.
1001   intros ? ? ? ? ? t_x_data t_y_data ? ? ? ? ? successful_txn msg_is_trade
1002     token_in_tx token_out_ty tx_neq_ty r_x'.
1003   destruct t_x_data as [stor_tx t_x_data].
1004   destruct t_x_data as [x_geq0 t_x_data].
1005   destruct t_x_data as [rate_rx rx_geq_0].
1006   (* first, prove that r_x' < r_x while r_z = r_z' for all other rates *)
1007   assert (r_x' <= r_x /\
1008     forall t,
1009       t <= t_x ->
1010       get_rate t (stor_rates cstate') = get_rate t (stor_rates cstate))
1011   as change_lemma.
1012   { intros.
1013     is_sp_destruct.
1014     rewrite msg_is_trade in successful_txn.
1015     pose proof (trade_entrypoint_check_pf cstate chain ctx msg_payload
1016       cstate' acts successful_txn)
1017     as token_in_qty.
1018     do 3 destruct token_in_qty as [* token_in_qty].
1019     destruct token_in_qty as [token_in_qty rates_exist].
1020     destruct rates_exist as [rate_in_exists rate_out_exists].
1021     (* get the new rates *)
1022     rewrite <- token_out_ty in tx_neq_ty.
1023     rewrite <- msg_is_trade in successful_txn.
1024     rewrite msg_is_trade in successful_txn.
1025     pose proof (trade_update_rates_formula_pf cstate chain ctx msg_payload cstate' acts successful_txn) as updating_rates.
1026     destruct updating_rates as [_ updating_rates].
1027     destruct updating_rates as [calc_new_rate_x other_rates_equal].
1028     (* split into cases *)
1029     split.
1030     = unfold r_x' - unfold get_rate
```

Zero-Knowledge Proofs

Produce e.g. **ZK-SNARK** to prove **knowledge of data**.

- ▶ Lurk:
“Correct execution of Lurk expressions can be proved in zero-knowledge.”
- ▶ Leo-lang pairs formal and zero-knowledge proof

Specification, Formal and Otherwise

- ▶ Theorem statement
- ▶ Formal statement/specification
- ▶ Statement/specification in specification language
- ▶ Execution trace/Data (?)

Correct Specifications

A proof is only as good as its statement/specification.

Specification Engineering

Features of specification engineering:

- ▶ Variables
- ▶ If ... then ... blocks
- ▶ Functions
- ▶ Hooks
- ▶ Assertions

Specification Engineering

```
Borda.spec X
Borda > Borda.spec
84
85 /*
86 Vote is the only state-changing function.
87 A vote can only affect the voter and the selected candidates, and has no effect on other addresses.
88 Vaddress c, c ≠ {f, s, t}.
89 { c_points = points(c) ∧ b = voted(c) } vote(e, f, s, t) { points(c) = c_points ∧ ( voted(c) = b ∨ c = e.msg.sender ) }
90 */
91 rule noEffect(method m) {
92   address c;
93   env e;
94   uint256 c_points = points(c);
95   bool c_voted = voted(c);
96   if (m.selector == sig:vote(address, address, address).selector) {
97     address f;
98     address s;
99     address t;
100    require( c != f && c != s && c != t );
101    vote(e, f, s, t);
102  }
103  else {
104    calldataarg args;
105    m(e, args);
106  }
107  assert ( voted(c) == c_voted || c == e.msg.sender ) &&
108         |points(c) == c_points, "unexpected change to others points or voted";
109 }
110
```

Specifications in Theorem Provers


Features of specifications in theorem provers:

- ▶ Much less engineering, more like prose
- ▶ Quantifiers: `forall` and `exists`
- ▶ Arbitrary specification
- ▶ Has access to formalized mathematics, but still constrained by computation
- ▶ Still extremely challenging

Smart Contract Specification

AMM specification:

- ▶ Pricing
- ▶ Efficient market
- ▶ Liquidity providers
- ▶ Rewards distribution
- ▶ Governance
- ▶ *etc.*



There is no formal way of establishing that a specification captures a concept, but we expect to have gained from using the proof methodology because (hopefully) a specification is easier to understand than a program, so that "convincing oneself" that a specification captures a concept is less error-prone than a similar process applied to a program. (Liskov and Zilles 1974)



Undone Science

1. We need to tackle the meta-analysis of correct specifications.
2. Formal analysis of specification correctness which does *not* devolve into a tower of meta-(...-)meta-specifications.

Take (pragmatic) inspiration from mathematics

- ▶ In ITPs, programs are **well-defined mathematical objects**
- ▶ Specifications gain meaning **in context** with other specifications